















SUBSTITUTABILITY CROSS-STREAM BETWEEN ORIENTED MARKETS: 
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I explicitly model the social mechanism that constructs markets. 
 
Producers array along a market profile along which buyers trade off quality for volume. Outcome 
features can be predicted from two ratios of parameters, yielding a MAP. Five distinct families of 
market cultures correspond to its regions. As previous work showed, Supply equaling Demand is 
transmuted into matchings across local variabilities of valuation with volume and with quality. 
Such matching is vulnerable to unraveling, but it can be achieved with market oriented either 
upstream or downstream. 
 
This paper probes siphoning between markets lying cross-stream and thus generalizes 
substitutability within a market. Siphoning is shown to support markets whose members face 
increasing returns to scale, which violates orthodox microeconomics. Figure 8 illustrates key 
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Needs that become socially shaped fuel the continuing processes of 
production whose uncertainty leads established agents of production to combine 
in mediation by markets. Production flows are pumped and filtered among firms 
by these markets as mechanisms. Each induces a quality ordering across the 
producer firms in that market. Then a producer need only watch the profile of 
volume versus revenue achieved by its fellow firms to decide its own optimal 
commitment. My Markets from Networks  (2002) presented explicit model for such 
markets. 
Now I go on to analyze how much one market can substitute for another 
and with what impact on market size. As its member firms procure from others 
upstream and sell to still others downstream, a production market also 
influences markets located cross-stream from it among the cascade of flows that 
constitute a production economy. Modeling this clarifies how markets can be 
sustained even in contexts where production firms are experiencing increasing 
returns to scale.  
To make this account self-contained, I first reprise previous results. I start 
with a fresh, and perhaps simpler introduction to the market model. A transition 
section then gives background and motivation for the new results in Part II, 
which depend on degree of substitutability between markets. Results change 
with substitutability to some extent even for varieties of contexts not marked by 
increasing returns to scale.  
 
Part I. Social construction of supply across quality through a market.  
Start from the familiar idea that price in a market comes from equating 
supply with demand. Plot the dollar worth W of the volume y that some firm 
produces as just a straight line, whose slope is the price, supposed the same for 
each firm. The firm anticipates paying out to procure supplies and incorporate 
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them into finished product in a flow of size y. From examining how its cost 
grows with volume y produced, the firm will pick that volume which maximizes 
its net income. Other producer firms, with their own cost structures, will offer 
volumes on that market too--so what price can accommodate them all? 
This messy question evokes a simple answer when, and only when, the 
buyers downstream do not discriminate among flows from the distinct firms. Say 
the customers downstream are buying hard winter wheat of grade 6, indifferent 
to the nuances separating Minnesota grain from Dakota grain. Then of course the 
same price is indeed on offer to every producer firm (here, silo). The total supply 
on offer is specified uniquely, from the single W(y) offer curve available in 
common to each producer, as the sum of the volumes each firm picks as optimal 
given its cost structure. If that total supply is more than the buyers in aggregate 
will take up, the price, the slope of W(y) will be dragged down, lowering the 
total volume producers will offer, perhaps also with the elimination of a firm or 
two with the highest cost structures. And so on, until the combination of lower 
price and lower volumes together close the gap between supply and demand. 
This special case is known as 'perfect competition'. (One does worry of course 
about how and in what time sequence various prices got signaled and volumes 
offered in an interim period (Arrow and Hahn 1971).) 
But usually   firms seek different niceness of product, with attendant 
differences in cost structure. Somehow, the perfect competition picture has to get 
extended so that differences in quality seen by the buyers is put in 
correspondence with the different niceness in product sought by different 
producers. How can such correspondence get socially constructed? What is the 
market mechanism? One has to meld volume commitments by firms with 
acceptance by buyers willing to pay more for higher quality as well as higher 
volume. There is never a Wizard of Oz, a Walras Imp at hand to design and 
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direct such correspondence.  This production market is a theatre having no 
director, just two sorts of actors dancing around. 
Go back to perfect competition. Note that just one parameter can specify 
the demand context that sets the price. Let the exponent that specifies curvature 
of buyer demand with volume y be denoted by the letter a. Now the market 
works as perfect competition only if each producer finds some definite volume to 
be its optimal choice. Let c denote the exponent that specifies curvature of cost 
with volume y from some producer firm: this choice of a simple form is suitable 
framing for practical business decision by the producer.  
Then the market works for that producer only if  
a  <   c   
so that the cost curve bows up, yielding decreasing returns to scale of 
production, vis a vis the diagonal line of revenue W(y). And even with different 
producers having different costs, a common price can be predicted, just from a 
and c. In situations where the qualities perceived for different producers are all 
the same, they may have close to the same exponent c describing curvature of 
their costs. Then only the two parameters a and c are involved, and it seems clear 
intuitively that only their ratio matters.  
Draw the range of possible ratios   a/c  as just a line segment from zero to 
unity. Position on that line segment will suffice to identify market price, for any 
given number of producer firms. Figure 1 shows this state space for perfect 
competition. 
-- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  -- 
Now stack another line segment alongside this one for perfect 
competition, and then another, and another, and so on until one has filled out a 
whole band on the plane. Let each step indicate an increase in sensitivity to 
difference in quality across the producer firms. Figure 2 shows such a strip map, 
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an enlarged state space. On this strip, perfect competition is confined to just the 
top edge, zero sensitivity to quality.  
-- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  -- 
This quality sensitivity must itself be some sort of ratio between the extent 
downstream of buyer sensitivity across degree of quality and the extent 
upstream of sensitivity to degree of quality evidenced by associated shift in cost 
structure. Designate these by b and d. So the ratio is  b/d, analogous to the ratio 
a/c with respect to volume. But b/d is not restricted between zero and unity--
buyer sensitivity to quality degree may be far greater (as well as far less, toward 
perfect competition) than the sensitivity of producers costs to quality degree.  
For each point in this map for market contexts we want to be able to 
specify the outcomes to be expected with that context for the market; but with 
particularities for a specific set of firms filled in only later, the same 
postponement as when using Figure 1 for predicting results of pure competition. 
Each point in Figure 2 is identified by two ratios, each of downstream to 
upstream, of sensitivity of valuation, with respect to volume on the vertical axis, 
a/c, and with respect to quality on the horizontal axis, b/d.  
Instead of using exponents, b and d, on size along some one index, we 
could have stuck with specifying two separate indices, for niceness, say n, and 
for quality, from the downstream and upstream perspectives. But it is clear 
intuitively that the firms must show the same rank order on quality as on 
niceness for the market to be coherent, and one can approximate differences 
between one and the other numerical index by applying different exponents to a 
common index. Hereafter let n denote this common index. 
Exactly the rub is that in only a few markets can one observe or report on 
any such common index. California wines may be one with published ratings for 
quality sensitivity (Benjamin and Podolny 2000). Participants have no occasion to 
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worry about indexing the cost side from niceness, since each producer is 
deciding on its own optimum from knowledge of the cost structure it is locked 
into regardless of how it compares with other firms with their distinct aims of 
niceness. We as analysts can work up such index from observations on cost, more 
easily than for quality sensitivity from heterogeneous aggregate buyers 
downstream.  
This sharpens the question of what mechanism can account for this 
market in differentiated products. Only quantitative indices of quality would 
suggest particular numerical outcomes to balance a market. The mechanism as 
social construction must work in terms of quantities observable by the relevant 
participants. The signaling has to be simple and practicable for business.  
The a,b,c,d specifications of context are simple and practicable, but only 
one of them is observable, c. Prices and volumes achieved in sales by all firms are 
the other obvious observables. So the mechanism in this social construction of a 
market must revolve around the array of market prices and volumes together 
with the c each firm estimates for its own cost structure.  
The market mechanism has to sort producers into distinct niches with 
distinct prices that induce from each producer a volume that downstream buyers 
accept, because of being equally good deals, that is tradeoffs between price and 
quality. Lower quality deserves lower price but thereby calls for higher volume: 
Each separate aspect is simple and obvious but yet will be shown to sustain a 
remarkable variety of outcomes for the market, such as degree of concentration, 
sheer sizes, profitabilities of producers.  
 
Market profile as mechanism  
Observability is the key. Everyone sees the ordering of producers by 
quality, the crux for a differentiated market, but aside from prices, the only 
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numerical readings by participants are volumes shipped by various producers, 
who each can make it their business to know. The observed set of prices for the 
various producers are easy to array, and to observe. If they can be plotted along 
some profile curve, it can de drawn through them in a graph of firm revenue 
W(y) by volume, as in Figure 3.  
-- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  -- 
This profile, when the producers read it as the framing for their choice of 
optimum volume to produce, is the mechanism for constructing a market. That 
profile will be established as viable for any period where the buyers downstream 
in aggregate perceived each of the menu of revenue-volume pairs as being 
equally attractive and requiring less money outlay than the maximum they 
would have found acceptable. 
With this profile seen to be viable in the previous period, producers are 
motivated to use it to guide their commitment to volume in the next period. 
They can each scan the whole curve to choose the volume that maximizes their 
net revenue over cost. (Only in a much longer run, and given resources to invest 
in infrastructure could the producer hope to change how buyers overall perceive 
their quality).  
To sum up, 
each producer has found a distinct niche by offering as good a 
tradeoff in quality for price as each other producer. Yet no one needs to or 
can specify distinct numerical qualities. Each producer will hear what 
volumes and prices its peers achieved and can fill in between these points 
to trace a market profile W(y) as its opportunity set for its next choice. 
Each producer optimizes separately in terms of the profile 
interpolated through observations of their several outcomes, revenue 
received for volume shipped. Because they are computing profit from the 
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difference between revenue and their cost, Figure 3 has plotted revenue 
rather than unit price as the ordinate versus volume shipped y as the 
abscissa. The buyers in aggregate are paying less than the maximum they 
would tolerate, and find no one of the producers to reject as offering a less 
good deal. Yet it is the producers who have to commit to volume before 
each period, and thus can maximize, whereas the only leverage on the 
buyer side is rejecting a proposal so that they have leverage only to 
satisfice equally, not to maximize across the menu of offerings from 
producers. 
 Such is the mechanism.  
Choices in a market accordingly calibrate its mechanism with observables 
and with computations well within business practice. The explicit model 
simplifies further by assigning simple parametric forms for cost and taste which 
are plausible while framing solutions simply enough to offer guidance over a 
great range of variety in context and constitution of market. 
We can suppose that a map like Figure 2 can show what combinations of 
numerical values for quality and volume ratios of parameters, downstream to 
up, lead to what market outcomes. Or in modeling jargon, specify the state space 
for this mechanism, as will be done below in Figure 4.  
 
Solutions 
 In what circumstances will this market mechanism come to reproduce 
itself for the next period of production? In order to optimize, a firm of quality n 
chooses the y at which W(y) parallels its cost structure, estimated as  
yc  times a scale factor, call it q(n).  
But the buyers downstream value that volume as  
ya  times a scale factor, call it r(n) 
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which of course also differs between firms according to perceived quality of their 
products. The (revenue/volume) pairs chosen by producers are points lying 
along a profile that guides them to optimum choices, but these must succeed in 
selling themselves to buyers; so the cost curves must be ordered consistent with 
the values assigned their qualities by buyers in aggregate: they must jibe. Jibing 
means enforcing the same ratio of buyer valuation to amount they pay, W(y), for 
every firm. Designate this ratio by tau, τ 
This market mechanism needs to accommodate sets of firms differing in 
number and in exact spacings on quality. But presentation of the analysis is 
simplified by thinking it through for a generic firm, with value n on quality 
index left arbitrary. It is a mathematical fact that the required W(y) profile can be 
entirely characterized just in terms of the generic firm that can be slid along the 
profile. This generic firm thus is transposable to play the role of any one of an 
actual set of producers for a market context.  
A differential equation in the market profile W(y) and the cost function of 
the firm n can be solved, which yields the volume firm n will choose as optimal. 
The equation of optimum choice is then to be replicated for each n. In parallel, 
one can equate revenue to some arbitrary but fixed fraction of the maximum 
value that buyers in aggregate would pay. This constraint from the buyer side 
sets up an equivalence across the replications across values of n. That proves 
sufficient to specify the exact shape or twist of W(y) profile that satisfies the 
pressures from both sides, producers and buyers.  
W(y) depends on a,b,c,d of course. Indeed, Figure 2 was suggested as state 
space for market mechanism on the intuitive ground that the ratio of upstream to 
downstream was what mattered to market operation. A ratio is a pure number 
suitable for use as an exponent, and unity stands out as middle value, as in 
Figure 2 for quality ratio. W(y) also depends on the scaling constants q and r for 
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each producer, which expressions r(n) and q(n) indicate vary from one producer 
to the next in quality ordering. But the point is that just the exponents b and d 
characterize this variation sufficiently to specify the shape of W(y), together with 
just baseline scale factors r and q, think of them as for quality n=1.  
One sees that W(y) need not cite n and so can indeed apply to all firms. 
Equation 1 will present the resulting formula. It groups these various parameters 
in order  to simplify scanning: To begin with, hereafter designate a/c by v and 
b/d by u, for volume and quality. At v=1.5, for example, the costs of producers 
are 50% less sensitive to expanding volume than is eagerness to buy that volume. 
At u=0.5, impact on costs from producing higher quality is twice the impact on 
the maximum buyers would pay. At u=1, costs are just as sensitive to upgrades 
in quality by that producer as is the downstream eagerness to buy its product.   
The formula for market profile boils down to:   
 
W(y)  =  (A yg+ k)f  (1) 
with f, g, and A just combinations of the parameters. Intuition suggested that 
curvature and thence viability of market profile should depend crucially on how 
far away v is from u, and in formula (1) the exponent g proves to be proportional 
to [1 -  (v/u)]. Accordingly, the diagonal is where they coincide, u = v, and 
curvature vanishes. 
The roles of g and f in formula (1) confirm that different locations in a 
plane map such as Figure 2 yield different profile curvatures, which indicate 
different patterns in pricing and profit for the representative firm of a market. A 
profile's overall exponent, designated f in formula (1), is  
1/(1-(1/u)) 
and so is inversely dependent on the inverse of u, the downstream/upstream 
ratio of quality dependencies.  
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(The multiplier A sets a scale for the profile. The value of A is proportional 
to the reciprocal of the product of f and g, and it further depends on the scale 
factor for cost curves of firms and the scale factor for schedules of maximum  
payment buyers in aggregate would offer for a menu with volumes of various 
qualities. A also depends on, besides these parameters, the ratio  τ  regarding 
buyers satisfaction )  
Guided by this solution we can try out a map of state space, designate it 
by MAP. But unlike in Figure 2, it is not clear we need to limit the range of v=a/c 
below unity. A main thrust of this paper is to show that the mechanism above 
need not be constrained to operate with decreasing returns to scale by producers. 
Figure 4 reports a MAP. 
-- FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE  -- 
The main diagonal, where curvature vanishes in W(y) as noted above, is 
highlighted in Figure 4. and this map splits into four quadrants, which give a 
first cut at differences in viability of markets as well as in performances of their 
producers. In the lower left, for example, the upper hand is held by buyers as to 
both volume and quality increases. Here producers vie for buyers who are 
relatively limited in their demand for volume and quality relative to what they 
cost producers. So the high volume producer is lower quality, lower cost.1   
Computations will be complex, especially once locations of a particular set 
of firms are introduced. There can be a feedback loop between revenue of each 
individual firm and the total market revenue mediated through the ratio τ. So 
the quantitative outcomes for any firm within the market will depend on the 
particular volumes along the profile picked by each other firm. Results are hard 
to fathom with prediction and computation become complex. 
But what is clear from formula (1) is that prediction breaks down when 
both of the ratios, u and v, are unity. The market profile requires that balancing 
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between buyer and producer sides spread out the firms into distinct optimal 
niches, which is hard when either ratio of upstream to downstream valuations is 
unity and is impossible when they both are. Accordingly, lines in Figure 4 have 
been interrupted at this central point (1,1).  And as already noted, whenever u = 
v  the profile is to exhibit zero curvature and may provide inadequate guidance 
on choices.  
Even given that its application is complex, does not this crisp formula (1) 
seem too neat to be believed? Firm quality n does not appear anywhere in 
formula (1), derived for the representative firm. Only because this same formula 
works for all the firms are we justified to speak just in terms of a representative 
firm of quality n.  So the only descriptors of the firm are y, the volume of 
product, and W, the revenue. What is missing? 
 
Contingency from agency 
Aspects of the maze of incidents and accidents in the maneuverings out of 
which W(y) gets constructed have already been subsumed into the formula (1) 
for a profile, in the form of two indexes. One is τ : buyers can insist that every 
producer offer a deal as least as good as the others, which enforces a value for 
this tradeoff ratio,  τ , but its size is indeterminate.  
The remaining symbol in formula (1), k, appeared as an integration 
constant from inverting the differential equation in W(y) to obtain solutions for 
the profile. One can see that this k shifts the actual height of the market profile, 
up for positive sign, and down for negative k. Since k is not determined by any 
of the parameters and descriptors of context, it subsumes and indexes a second 
indeterminacy in the net impact of the evolutionary path to profile.  
The height of profile interacts with the shape or twist in market profile 
W(y) to affect whether any given firm can actually earn positive profit. So k must 
 12 
have presence in the MAP. Seek for each context the range of values of k which 
yield profiles that can accommodate would be producers whatever their quality 
n. (These will be exhibited in Figure 7.) The same range of k applies across whole 
polygonal sub regions of the MAP. Whereas for tau, which indexes the first 
indeterminacy, the same range can yield viable profiles at any point in MAP, 
Figure 4. 
Other regions specify contexts where it is impossible for all producers to 
find distinct volumes optimal, and/or to earn positive profits, for one or more 
possible profile among those with correct shape for that market context. A profile 
with any given value of k will induce a distinct mapping from putative value of 
n to corresponding volume y, y(n), that maximizes profit for that n.  But a profile 
shape which is viable by the criteria introduced thus far may not prove robust 
across the whole range of heights from values of k specified by Figure 7 for that 
point. The profile may be subject to unraveling by producers at one end of the 
quality ordering.  
A market profile is robust only if the context is such that the profile is not 
vulnerable to unraveling by actions of would-be producer firms. The diagonal, u 
= v, proves to bound on one side the halves of the lower left and upper right 
quadrants from Figure 4 where profiles are robust, labeled there COMMON and 
ADVANCED.  Equilibrating a market profile from COMMON, for example, 
depends on the volume valuation tradeoff ratio v between the two sides being 
larger than the quality valuation tradeoff ratio u. Exactly the opposite statement 
holds with respect to ADVANCED. (For simplicity refer to these two triangular 
regions also as quadrants.)   
Especially useful for assessing variation of profile with context is the 
special case of k = 0, a median sort of profile for which computations are simpler. 
Profit rates of different firms are then the same, and indeed this single profit rate 
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for a market proves to be the same everywhere along any straight line which 
runs through the central point (1,1) in Figure 4. Examples are shown in Figure 5. 
But market size varies along such line as we shall see in Part II, and market 
concentration also varies.  
-- FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE  -- 
 
Larger stories, and market orientation 
Evolution of a market is caught up in still larger stories of contingency 
and agency. Each market only establishes itself in interactive jockeyings with 
other market groupings seeking footing among sets of firms with some overlaps-
-a complex path of evolution. In a longer perspective the population of such 
markets emerged more or less gradually from earlier Putting Out systems. 
Reaping profit from the greater capacity and productivity gained from division 
of labor led entrepreneurs to 'put out' raw materials and/or tools to dispersed 
households and workshops, prefiguring procurement and supply along stream 
through markets today, in each of which producers were adding value to the 
flow.  
Today's market constructs itself through its producer firms seeking 
insulation from Knightian uncertainty in making their commitments for output 
in the next period. Each firm watches the preceding actions of its peers as signals 
of a profile of choices for their commitments. If producers' own self-interested 
choices of volumes lock them into place in a pecking order by quality accepted 
downstream then their choices of commitment levels are sheltered from 
downstream uncertainty. 
Such market or industry has become taken-for-granted in the perceptions 
also of other markets and firms upstream and down as the place to go for the 
overall sort of product identified as and in their line-of-business. But business is 
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subject to larger eruptions, such as inflation, either general or along an industry's 
own lines of procurement. Pressured by such change, producers in a market may 
come to agree the greater uncertainty is now upstream, and look upstream for 
signals to guide their costly commitments. 
So the market profile may orient back upstream toward suppliers. (This 
will be modeled in Section B of Part II--see Figure 9 there). Either way, the 
setting, and acceptance, of production commitments by producers involves three 
roles, rather than just buyers and sellers.  In vying with each other, producers are 
each establishing a niche of quality whose volume reflects substitutability with 
the products of its peers, who as a whole have become established as a line of 
business, a market for a recognized type of product.  But now we see that the 
substitutability that counts may be in the perceptions of suppliers upstream 
rather than customers downstream. This leads us toward Part II which analyzes 
substitutability between markets both when orientation is upstream and when it 
is downstream. As a transition I lay out some background and motivation. 
 
Conventions, wine markets and PARADOX 
Over the past two years I have collaborated with an interdisciplinary 
French team at INRA in Montpelier to study markets in the wine sector. This 
team is conversant with the Convention School in French social science, which 
partitions industries among four or so cultures of justification and quality.  Each 
culture is bound up with distinctive social network configurations. This School 
had noted (Favereau 1996) a correspondence between these socio-cultural 
Conventions of theirs and the broad sorts of market mechanism that I had 
distinguished (White 1981). These 1996 discussions in Paris led me to write a 
book-length account of W(y) (White 2002).  
 15 
So the INRA team turned to me in hopes for specific models, applicable to 
markets within the wine sector in Languedoc-Roussilon that fit into one or 
another of these Conventions. Also, along with markets, this team were 
investigating networks in and among producer cooperatives (Chiffoleau, 
Dreyfus, and Touzard 2001) and in this had been guided by an earlier book of 
mine (White 1992). Their interests have been widening to now include Midi wine 
more generally, and also international wines, as well as further reaches of 
distribution networks. 
The first of three difficulties of collaboration was that the INRA team 
collected statistical reports on average price over time rather than market profile 
of price. Use of average price presupposes the pure competition fable, wherein 
anonymous producers enter and leave a market at will in adjustments to a 
determinate outcome between buyers and sellers. My model has the market 
mechanism running on variance rather than average of price, whereas the INRA 
team continued to think in conventional terms of Supply equilibrating with 
Demand. And the second difficulty was that many of these demarcations of 
markets for routine statistics do not fit with the boundaries required by my 
molecular view of market mechanism.  
So we had arguments which led me to elaborate on how my model 
transmutes Supply-and-Demand into pressures cross-stream between markets. 
The main goal of this paper is further exploration of such pressures, which can 
also be analyzed at more micro level in terms of uncertainties among egos and 
alters (e.g., Podolny 2001). And I am having discussions with business school 
analysts of wine market strategies, who also seek explanatory accounts without 
invoking or modeling explicit market mechanism (Roberts and  Reagans 2002; 
Roberts and Ingram  2001) 
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Roberts and Reagans take observed average prices of brands as ex post 
signals of their quality and argue that previous exposure in the U.S. enhances the 
attention given to these signals. That is not out of line with the perspective in my 
models: neither delves into possible consumer segmenting. Their test is a 
standard approach through nested regression models, with standard claims of 
estimating statistical probabilities.  
The Roberts and Ingrams paper examines instead the organizational 
infrastructure for wine sales, in particular impacts from access to better support 
and information from upstream suppliers. Again this is consistent with my social 
construction view but again there is no explicit mechanism setting the prices. 
Market prices either just drop from heaven, as in pure competition fable, or rise 
up out of the black box of ex post statistical modeling. Again the results seem 
significant in several senses.  
Preliminary analysis of data for French wines indicated that in some eras 
important parts of the wine sector do have markets that face upstream. The third 
difficulty was that the INRA team, along with other analysts, had special trouble 
with understanding, much less applying, this dual, upstream version of my 
model. Section B below aims to ease this difficulty. Matthew Bothner already has 
offered guidance on strategic implications of possible switches in the orientation 
by a market (Bothner and White 2001). Difficulty in understanding the upstream 
model partly derives from the implicit assumption in the usual pure competition 
story that a market faces downstream, and its neglect of the three-way 
interaction between upstream, market and downstream in establishing the 
market. 
One change in the French wine sector that had profound impact was 
consumers turning away, around the late nineteen-fifties, from table wines, 
wines of low and rather undifferentiated quality.2 Initial positions in the upper 
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left quadrant (labeled TRUST in my book) were replaced by subsequent locations 
within this lower left quadrant labeled COMMON in Figure 4. 
Two markets for points near each other in the plane of v and u, Figure 5, 
may well tend to be similar also in underlying infrastructure in social networks 
of ties (cf. Granovetter 1985; Nohria and Eccles 1992). They may further be 
similar in the associated mores and tales characteristic of their industries. All 
together these similarities make up the Conventions of a common culture, as 
conceived by the French school of that name introduced earlier. (But as we shall 
see in Part II substitutability between markets need not be thus confined.) 
Olivier Favereau was led to claim in 1996 a match between my model's 
predictions in MAP from using formula (1), on the one hand,  and the 
Convention School's account of four distinctive sorts of industrial cultures, on the 
other hand. He argues that the interpretive patterns found for each of those four, 
on the basis of intensive field studies of selected European markets, fit in well 
with the sort of behavioral outcomes which one might expect for market profiles 
with u and v values in a quadrant in Figure 5, and which I had assigned to 
various American industries (White 1981, 1988). The Favereau mapping is from 
Convention to the polygonal regions distinguished earlier by range of the index 
of indeterminacy, k (plotted in Figure 7 below). 
It was Favereau's claim that energized me to extend and elaborate earlier 
papers as a book. But a key component in this claimed mapping was a further 
region not shown in Figures 4 and 5. Indeed this extension doubles the map, 
adding the whole other side in which u takes negative values.3 Figure 6 reports 
this enlargement of Figures 4 and 5. The top of the left side of Figure 6 (which, 
unlike Figures 3 and 5 has to be laid out sideways) are contexts where every 
profile is subject to unraveling. So market profiles are viable in this upper region 
only when v < 1.  
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-- FIGURE  6  ABOUT HERE -- 
These additional contexts are where product with lower cost structure is 
more desirable downstream, which seems a paradox, so label the additional 
allowed quadrant PARADOX. Perhaps a first-mover producer triggers a new 
market as other producers came in but without the first-mover's advantages in 
optimal location, or creative ability best developed. This could be in copper 
mining, and it seems true, for example, of the disposable diaper and the log 
home industries circa 1970.  
Eymard-Duvernay assigns the label Domestique  to a community of 
markets that Favereau maps into this region labeled  PARADOX in Figure 6. 
That quadrant is exemplified by AOC wines--distinctive and traditional wines 
subject to strict oversight. They depend heavily for their certification on inherited 
formulas and expertise, and/or specific climate pattern and on localities with 
special gradients and soil compositions of land. Entered in Figure 6 also are the 
likely identifications of quadrants with Conventions. As to cepage, the Australian 
wines you see in American stores are closely akin to and indeed are displacing 
French versions in markets like England.   
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Part II. Cross-stream substitutability between markets 
The rest of this paper focuses on impacts upon a market as a whole that 
are the indirect result of the presence of other markets lying in structurally 
equivalent positions in flows from upstream to down. Just as there are no 
production flows between producers lying parallel within a given market, so too 
there are no flows between markets lying cross-stream. At either level the 
pressures are the indirect effect of transactors, perhaps upstream and perhaps 
downstream, insisting on comparably valued outcomes from the cross-stream 
firms and the cross-stream markets. Substitutability within the market is seen as 
accompanied by siphoning between markets.  
It is only at the level of firms within a market that a transitive ordering of 
quality emerges: Substitutability between markets is conceived in simpler terms 
and characterized by just a single parameter. And the focus on market siphoning 
justifies further simplification in portraying the mutual positioning of firms 
within a given market from the modeling in Part I   
Section A lays out the sector model for downstream orientation of the 
market mechanism and Section B does so for upstream orientation. Section B 
parallels Section A and so can be much shorter, but we will see the outcomes for 
upstream orientation are quite different, despite the abstract duality with Section 
A. Outcomes may apply to clusterings of wine markets that correspond to the 
Conventions of the French school, as well as to the wine sector as a diverse 
ensemble of such clusterings. They can suggest feedback effects involving 




Section A: Markets facing down-stream 
 
The first subsection analyzes markets without cross-stream analogs and 
thus with no substitutability between markets. These no doubt are rare. But 
many intricacies carry over that are harder to penetrate once cross-stream 
pressure is addressed explicitly, and yet most of the description and the auxiliary 
formulas carry over. So the first subsection, which serves to frame the later ones, 
should be longest, and besides, its main equations are not duplicated in my book 
(White 2002).  
 
Formulas for a market on its own  
Formula (1) for the market profile was derived for a representative firm, 
with arbitrary value on quality n. We now seek  to understand and predict 
outcomes for the whole set of firms in that market. Since specific quality values 
are not observed for firms, we have to work with a set of n's, distinct though 
unknown. Later, in application to a particular market we can resort to numerical 
computations, in what must be an iterative process to allow for interactions 
between firm's choices of volume. But insight and guidance come best from 
explicit formulas. Only for the median case, k = 0, can explicit closed solutions be 
obtained for a set of firms. This median case is assumed hereafter. This special 
case, as discussed earlier, imposes a homogeneity, that every firm have the same 
profit rate. Fortunately, the focus of this Part II is on aggregate market revenues, 
which should be little affected by imposing an internal homogeneity: 
The scale factor for cost curve, from out of the multiplier A in formula (1), 
is designated as q, for a lowest quality firm, n=1. The scale factor for buyers side, 
r, is then specified as a ratio to q,  
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a ratio designated as alpha, α . And τ also contributes to A. Whereas  α 
compares buyers scale to cost scale,  τ compares buyers scale to amount buyers 
actually pay which is greater than cost; so one expects that α/τ  is greater than 
unity.  
Then for any set of firms scattered along a quality index, one can derive 
from (1)--the profile for the context specified by some point in Figure 6--an 
explicit formula for total market revenue: Designate this aggregate market 
revenue by W . This is just the sum over revenues of individual firms. For k=0, 
each of these can be expressed as the same multiple of its particular value of n 
raised to the same power.       
 
W  = q{(α/τ).(e/(e+1))v}1/(1-v).[{Σ: n=1,..,N}  nd e ] (2) 
 
where  
e =  (v- u) / (1 - v)   (3) 
   
Neither tau nor alpha is observable, but interviews can give a sense of the 
size of tau, and especially its stability.   
 
Variations of aggregate revenue 
W depends on u only through u's impact on e. Note that each value of e 
identifies a ray, some one of the straight lines that can be drawn through the 
central point (u=1, v=1) which were illustrated in Figure 5: the slope of a ray is 
e/(e+1). The diagonal corresponds to e=0, and  e = infinity identifies the ray v=1. 
In the remaining two quadrants of Figure 4, equation (2) does not apply because 
k=0 does not yield a profile that is viable and robust: (Section B will show that 
 22 
those other two quadrants do yield, for upstream orientation, viable profiles 
along hyperbolas through (1,1).)   
Further derivation confirms that the production costs of the firms, and 
their aggregate costs across the market, follow a formula which is just a multiple 
of equation (2). And further that the ratio of revenue to cost remains the same 
along the whole length of a ray through (1,1). The ratio of cost to revenue is 
given by e/(e+1). Examples of rays with ratios of 0 (the diagonal), 1/2 (for e=1), 
and 1  (v=1) were entered in Figure 5. 
It is clear that W increases with the number of firms, designate that by #. 
W also increases with the range of quality over the firms, which is the upper 
limit N in the summation over n's. But the extent of the latter increase depends 
on the value of e.  
One can also probe how W  depends on various parameters by taking 
partial derivatives. For example, the proportionate increase of W   with v is easily 
derived from (2) using the identity 
d ln W  /d v  =  (1/W ) (dW /d v). 
where "ln" is standard notation for taking the natural logarithm: 
 
d lnW /d v  = [ ln (α/τ)  + ln (e/(e+1))]/ ((1-v)2 (4) 
with the other parameters held constant, Note that u must be changing in consort 
with v in order to keep e fixed, by equation (3). (Throughout, u = b/d  while v = 
a/c.) 
This pattern of variation makes sense intuitively. The explosion of size of 
the rate of change of revenue at v=1 is, however, an artifact. The array of firm 
qualities, which is what distinguishes this model from the pure competition 
story, does not appear in (4) because of the logarithmic form. 
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Estimating parameters for prediction 
Equation (1) is a creation of analysts. It is to be used to predict and 
understand changes in market outcomes, as context changes, and/or as 
particular firms enter and leave, and/or as they change in their quality levels 
following upon investment. Return to the reality of a particular market with its 
firms in a viable equilibrium. The participants know neither about equation (1) 
nor about its many parameters, although they no doubt perceive the ordering of 
firms by quality.  
Each producer has selected an optimum volume with associated outcome 
in revenue that is public knowledge. An observer can record these points along a 
profile and also record the profile slopes at those points. That provides all the 
information needed to estimate all parameters in equation (1), as shown in White 
(1992, pp. 158-165). This estimation cannot distinguish alpha from tau, however. 
Neither by itself is observable, only the ratio α/τ.  
So it is from the observed W(y), on the left side of equation (1) used as a 
formula, that these parameters on the right side of equations (1) - (4) are 
determined. The estimations of k and of (α/τ) have removed the two 
indeterminacies, but only for the observed case. The issue is which estimates 
correspond to parameters that one can take as fixed in computing predictions 
from assumed changes in other estimates: for example, the use of equation (4) to 
predict change in market revenue from change in producers' returns to scale in 
cost. Of all the estimates, perhaps the least plausible to keep fixed is k. Alpha 
may well stay fixed and interviews can suggest whether tau also stays fixed, in 
which case their ratio, what is actually estimated, stays fixed. 
Equation 2 shows that aggregate market revenue W   actually decreases as 
tau increases. The better the deal buyers end up with, that is, the less revenue 
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there will be in the market. The tau itself may tend to settle on the same level 
among related markets such as those making up a Convention.  
 
Siphoning between markets 
Now, finally!, turn aside from this up/downstream context of a market to 
examine impacts from its cross-stream context. The context cross-stream consists 
in markets that are parallel, included neither among suppliers nor customers of 
producers within the given market. Markets lying cross-stream have no 
transactions but they are structurally equivalent to some degree with respect to 
whom they tie to downstream for sales, and also perhaps upstream for 
procurement. Some degree of substitutability ordinarily reigns between such 
markets which plays off substitutability across the firms within a market.  
This degree of substitutability, being quite independent of the v and u that 
specify up/downstream context for the representative firm, invokes a parameter 
of its own. Designate this parameter by x, the degree of "Xcuse me for butting 
in". (This, the inverse of the parameter, gamma, used in White (2002, chapter 6), 
proves to simplify subsequent equations.) 
The limiting case of no substitutability, a market as unique source to 
downstream customers, is x=1, yields the previous formulae for a market on its 
own in the previous section.  The higher that x lies above unity, the higher the 
substitutability. This parameter is not a ratio like u and v. The market producers 
act in consort only in one direction, with respect to down-stream, and so only in 
that direction can substitutability be specified. The mathematical device used is 
an exponential cap. This is a cap on the sum of buyers' valuations across the 
packages (volume and price, W(y)) offered by the various firms. The exponent 
applied to the sum is 1/x.  
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Some degree of substitutability for unique markets is allowed in formulas 
for firm and market aggregate sizes in White (2002). With some substitutability 
there appears a split within the upper quadrants of MAP, Figure 6, where v > 1, 
by whether v is greater or less than that x, when that is taken as greater than 1. A 
lower band of the ADVANCED quadrant with x > v > 1 can be labeled 
CROWDED. Some sort of siphoning is indicated, since the prediction is for W  
actually to grow when the number of firms, #, decreases. 
The present market model is to be specified by a small set of parameters of 
mechanism and context. These should dovetail to permit explicit numerical 
calculations across a spectrum of cases wide enough for mapping observable 
markets. Thus, for example, cross-elasticity of demand, familiar from economics 
texts, should be kept distinct from x. First, the elasticity construct has no agreed, 
unambiguous definition. Second, with it there often is appeal to cognitive 
framing as distinct from social interaction. Elasticity is referred to products 
already defined in this cognitive framing by intrinsic attributes, whereas 
substitutability x here specifies siphoning between markets as arrays that each 
melds producer with product into a quality ordering which is interactive in 
determining a profile that is path dependent. 
Siphoning is useful as a natural science metaphor for these cross-stream 
impacts. We will find that this siphoning can be backward into as well as 
forward out of the given market. Just so, if someone stealing gasoline from a car 
tank is suddenly hoisted up, the stolen gasoline will siphon right back down into 
the car.  
Examine the impact of substitutability on market aggregate revenue, W .  
The generalization of equation (2) is  
 
W  = q{(α/τ)x(e/(e+1))v[{Σ: n=1,..,N} n-d e] 1-v}1/(x-v)  (5) 
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A whole series of subsidiary equations will be derived to provide a framework for 
detailed applications.  
 
Increasing returns-to-scale--CROWDED region 
When x is greater than v, the aggregate revenue is smaller for larger 
substitutability, just as intuition requires. Formula (5) also confirms that this 
erosion in size becomes more extreme within the upper quadrants of MAP, 
where the power, 1/(x-v), can indeed approach infinity. The upper-right 
quadrant labeled ADVANCED in MAP ( Figure 4) corresponds to the Industriel  
Convention in Favereau's terminology. We see that markets from its upper part, 
with v > x, resemble a good deal the markets in the previous section with v > 1--
and x stipulated to be 1. (This extends to the explosion at x=v being an artifact). 
No further special analysis need be given, especially since I do not think any 
examples of wine markets occur here. 
Two features of the basic equation (5) are especially important. First, is the 
appearance of the whole new sort of region, that lying between v=1 and v=x, that 
was labeled CROWDED earlier. When x decreases to 1 you can think of this 
region as being collapsed into the single ray, v=1. Markets from this region have 
a peculiar feature. Aggregate revenue, W , appears to decline with increase in the 
number of firms, #, and to increase with the range of quality, N. And perhaps 
they are combustible -- albeit kept viable by siphoning measured by an x to be 
assessed relative to v. But detailed analysis is required, and computations in 
terms of explicit values for parameters.  
 -- FIGURE  7 ABOUT HERE  --   
The second important feature is the persistence of rays, such as those 
shown in Figure 5, which will be repeated in Figure 7. Variation of W  with 
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quality sensitivity, u, is traced best along these rays where e is held constant. This 
variation, complementary to variation with the size of v, flips over between v<1 
and v>1, which is to say between COMMON and CROWDED.  
For detailed analysis we need estimates of parameters. But we can clarify 
the general import. Dicta from orthodox economics suggest that a competitive 
market cannot continue if producers experience increasing returns to scale, 
corresponding to v > 1. In fact, though, uncertainty continues to dog producers' 
choices in committing to volumes. This uncertainty presses them to gird 
themselves with a market profile. Throughout the two upper quadrants, v>1 in 
MAP, an external theorist may see possible exploding commitments deriving 
from increasing returns to scale in production across producers of all qualities, 
but the context is opaque to participants, so that one need not assert unraveling. 
The same as with v < 1, the basic market discipline is insistence by the 
buyer side on equally good deals, calibrated by τ) in equations (2) and (4). And 
the outcomes with v > 1 continue to make sense. First, viable markets are 
predicted for v>1 only if also the differentiation by quality costs less than it is 
worth to buyers: u>1. Equation (4) shows that revenue continues to grow as v 
increases for v large as well as small, but only for larger values of e: As e grows 
small, ln (e/(e+1)) becomes large and negative, swamping the positive ln (beta). 
So, second, viable markets for v>1 are predicted to crash in size of revenue when 
v grows further except when the quality impact u grows larger even faster.  
The logarithmic form of equation (4) obscures a basic change in regime 
across the line v=1. The discontinuity at v=1 is built into the market mechanism, 
which depends on profile curvature derived from inequality between the 
sensitivity ratios u and v. Equation (2) shows that W   grows large as v grows 
toward 1 and then crashes to a small value for v just beyond unity. So W   is 
indeed still growing there with v, but from a much smaller base than for v just 
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below unity. Thus, third, markets are large in addition to robust only for a 
middle cone in this high-stakes quadrant of MAP, in contexts close neither to the 
diagonal ray nor to the v=1 ray. Substantively, markets flourish for increasing 
returns to scale only when quality sensitivity overbalances volume sensitivity 
without the latter sinking to unity. Later Figure 8 will show how degree of 
substitutability fits in with this picture.  
 
Estimation of parameters 
Again estimation proceeds from direct examination of locations of firms 
along the profile of a particular market. The procedure is exactly as in the 
previous section. What then is the test for degree of substitutability? What is the 
actual estimate of x?  
This x does not even appear in equation (1), the basis of the procedure. 
And the value of (α/τ) no longer is estimated by this procedure: specifically, its 
value cannot be equated to Agf/q. That now would be a mis-specification 
because the role of (α/τ) has been enhanced by the self-consistent feedback that 
determines W  once x exceeds unity.  
The maximum buyers would pay is, by hypothesis, just τ  times W.  Yet 
this maximum is also the sum of the buyer valuations of packages of producers 
taken severally, once the exponential cap, 1/x, is applied. So the tau being 
estimated is in fact transformed to τx   times  W 1-x . But only the ratio α/τ is 
estimable from the observables. The α of course transforms to α x . So the 
transformation expressed in terms of observables is:  
 
alpha/tau -->  (α/τ) x . W 1-x   (6) 
and it is the right side that is to be equated to the number obtained as Agf/q 
from the standard estimation procedure. Several procedures can lead to 
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identification of x, and thus also alpha/tau. (This is called the fifth phase of 
estimating W(y) parameters in White 2002, chapter 8--where, as noted earlier, the 
parameter for substitutability is the reciprocal of x, there designated gamma.) 
For convenience, work with the logarithms.  The most direct approach is 
to observe the same market with other parameters unchanged but after a shake-
up, triggered say by attempted collusion among producers, led to a new profile 
with new values for the two indeterminacy indexes. Designate the new size of A 
as A'. (The new and old sizes k'  and k of the other indeterminacy index are not 
used below). The two equations [which do not derive from equation (5)] are 
ln (Agf/q) = ln (α/τ)x    + (x - 1) ln W   (7) 
and 
ln (A'gf/q) = ln (α/τ) x   + (x - 1) ln W  '   (7') 
Subtracting one equation from the other yields an estimation for x: 
 
x  =  1  +  [ ln (A/A')/ ln ( W   /W  ' ) ] (8)  
Then (α/τ) can be estimated from (7) or (7)'. If a believable estimate of tau has 
been obtained from interviews, then insertion of it and W  will yield an estimate of 
alpha. 
A second procedure would be to pair equation (5) with equation (7), which 
requires that k=0. Multiply equation (5) in logarithmic form by (x-v), then subtract 
it from equation (7). The (α/τ) term has dropped out, so one has an equation with 
only one unknown, x. This difficult inversion can be eased by the approximations 
developed below for components in equation (5). Again then equation (7) will 
yield an estimate for (alpha/tau).  
A third procedure, using equation (5), requires observing two contexts for 
the market with but one parameter changed, and k remaining zero. If this is 
feasible, one can eliminate most terms by subtracting equations to obtain an 
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equation in only x as unknown. For example, if the change is in the cost scale, q, 
perhaps because of an engineering innovation adopted by all the producers, one 
has the estimation equation 
x  =   v { 1 -  [ln (q/ q')/ ln ( W  / W  ')]}  (9) 
 
Variation between rays 
Detailed analysis of effects is complicated, and the dependence on e, the ray 
designator defined by equation (3), is crucial. To make discussion and analysis of 
this and related formulas less cumbersome, we need to simplify the summation Σ 
over values of n, each raised to a power in e, as in equations (2) and (5).  
We could express this sum as # times an average term, as in White (2002, 
equations 7.3, 7.4). This or any other approximation implies replacing the arbitrary 
set of # values with some definite array. Label the highest value of n as N, so that  
the set of qualities range from its minimum quality of 1 to N.  
The baseline array I will use here is regular spacing of the n values. This is 
apt for applications to wine markets. Then I approximate the sum by a definite 
integral:  
 
{Σ: n=1,..,N}  n-d e =  (#/ N) .  |nd(- e+1) /(-e +1)| (10) 
On the right side, the left term (#/N) is the reciprocal of the quality spacing 
between adjacent firms, which justifies the introduction of dn within the integral. 
The right term, the bracketed integral, is its value for n = N after subtraction of 
its value at n=1. The formula, though simpler to compute than the summation, is 
still not transparent.  
There is a special case for the intermediate value of e=1: 
{Σ: n=1,..,N} n-d e =  (#/ N) .  ln N.  (10-medium) 
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And the general case simplifies for rays with small e (near the diagonal): 
{Σ: n=1,..,N}  n-d e = # (N -1) / N.  (10-low) 
And also for rays with large e (near the v-1 ray):  
{Σ: n=1,..,N}  n-d e =  # / N (e -1).  (10-high) 
Throughout the numerical computations, set d=1, which simply calibrates n by 
the cost side. For simplicity this term derived by (10) will hereafter just be called 
Sum. 
It is clear that the average term and thus the Sum is determined essentially 
by N, except for large e, where the sum gets very large, mainly from the 
contribution from the lowest quality, n=1. For small e, the average term can be 
small, while for the border case of e=1 the average term can be near unity. A 
large range in quality, big N, favors a small sum for e=1, but an average term of 
unity for  e small.   
 
Variation along rays, and backward siphoning 
Three approximate versions of the basic equation for aggregate revenue, 
(5), result from substituting for the Sum factor on the right the three versions of 
formula (10) for values of the Sum along rays with high, medium and low values 
for e. The factors inside the parentheses are now rather simple. Yet computations 
are confusing because of the nesting of various exponentials of terms.   
Probe first the change of W  as v is increased along a ray, with x held 
constant. Then after briefly probing other parameters, end by the crucial probe, 
that of the cognate variation of W  as x is changed for a given value of v (and 
fixed value for e and other parameters). The initial probe for v traces change as a 
function along a ray in Figure 7; whereas a probe for u (folded into e with v) 
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would trace along a horizontal line--moving toward the diagonal ray for u >1 
and moving toward the diagonal for u <1.  
Consider how aggregate size of market, designated W , varies when a 
parameter is changed a bit. A partial differential equation is appropriate. 
Keeping other parameters constant, the proportionate difference in aggregate 
size of market corresponding to some small difference in v is given by the 
following formula, with all else held constant:  
d ln W /d v  = {[ 1 - (x/xc)]  . ln (Sum)}/ (x-v)2  (11) 
 
Again, Sum is defined by equation (10). An expression that proves to be a critical 
value for x emerged in the derivation:  
 
(1/ xc )  =  {1 -  [ln {α/τ) . (e/(e+1))}/ ln (Sum)]} (12) 
Note that v does not figure in equation (12), which depends instead on e.  
Equation (11) is the analog to equation (4) for x=1. Note the great 
differences induced by x no longer being unity. The Sum term did not even 
appear in equation (4), but is crucial in (11) and (12) both. In (11), it is the (fixed) 
value of x that determines the numerator, since v appears only in the 
denominator. The Sum is at least unity so that its logarithm is positive, as is the 
denominator, as a square.  
So the crucial question, whether revenue is growing or falling as v 
increases, depends entirely on whether x is less or greater than the expression 
labeled xc by equation (12). When x is greater than xc then revenue is declining as 
v increases. Detailed analysis and computations show that  xc tends for many 
contexts to be less than or not much over unity. And x itself must exceed unity, 
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which suggests that W  typically decreases as v increases, and it does so faster 
since the denominator grows.  
Explore further the variation of W  . There is growth in revenue as e is 
increased (tending toward the ray v=1) so that substantial values of revenue can 
be found for contexts in CROWDED. This comes from equation: 
 
 
d ln W/d e = {[v/(e/e+1)] + [(1-v) (d ln (Sum)/ d e)]}/ (x-v)  (13) 
The differentiation inside on the right can be expanded from the three 
approximations to equation (10). Note that the denominator is now a linear not a 
squared difference. The corresponding equation for N also would require three 
different versions.  
The parallel equation for # is very simple, however:  
 
d ln W /d # = (1-v) / # . (x-v)  (14) 
As already noted, there is growth in revenue with number of producers except 
for v in the band between unity and x. Yet this proportionate rate of growth gets 
lower as # increases. If one chooses to regard (α/τ) as a proper parameter, the 
entailed equation is 
similar to (14):  
d ln W /d (α/τ) = x / (α/τ) . (x-v)  (15) 
Again revenue increases with the size of the parameter, and at a decreasing rate. 
Now, finally, turn to the proportionate change in W  with increments in x, 
for v fixed, along with e, N, #, etc. The result appears remarkably similar to the 
equations for change with v:  
 
d lnW /d x  = {[ 1 - (v/vc)]  . ln (Sum)}/ (x-v)2 (16) 
where  
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vc  =   xc  (17) 
and the  xc  is defined already in equation (12). The critical point will now be 
exceeded for each of the upper range of values for v. (Computations show there 
may be some exceptions with values of e moderately above unity and reasonable 
values on other parameters)  
This suggests backward siphoning: that is, the given market drawing in 
revenue rather than losing it as the pressure of the substitutability cap exponent 
increases. The differential equation necessarily is consistent with the basic 
equation for W , equation (5). Figure 8 plots the curve of revenue versus x, other 
parameters fixed, for two different values of v, one greater than vc  and one less: 
note that vc  is fixed  by other parameters without regard to the value of v. One 
can visualize the probe as along a line perpendicular to the plane of MAP, which 
it intersects at some point in CROWDED region.  
 
 -- FIGURE  8 ABOUT HERE  --   
Note that neither curve converges to zero.4 Each instead approaches the 
value (α/τ) as x increases indefinitely. One curve, for v <  vc  , begins at an 
indefinitely large value and with a very large rate or decline. The other, for v >  
vc  , begins with zero revenue and grows very fast for first increases. 
 
If v happens to fall right at  vc then there is an indeterminacy. Either curve 
may occur, depending on the historical details of emergence of that market 
profile for that context. This is indeterminacy on a level beyond that of k and A 
indeterminacies.   
 
A program of applied work will need to use tables of prediction formulas 
specialized by quadrant, along with the computer programs for carrying out 
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numerical iterations when unavoidable. The broadest possible overview is also 
helpful. To provide that, reformulate the differential equation for decrease of  ln 
W  with x: 
 
(1/W) dW/dx =  - { ln W  -  ln (α/τ) }/(x-v)        (18) 
 This offers simple, yet elusive, guidance. The main point is that so long as 
W  is larger than (alpha/tau) it will keep declining (though at decreasing rate) so 
long as substitutability cap pressure, x, is increasing. Further, we see from 
formula (18) that anywhere in MAP even the proportionate, the percentage 
decrement in W  is increasing, for given raise in x, with the sheer size of W , 
albeit only on a logarithmic scale. This is a sort of internal contagiousness to the 
decrement set off with increase in substitutability due to other markets.  
And indeed qualitatively there seem to be such internal feedback loops in 
withering of the markets of many a cluster of the French wine sector. And of 
course the formula works in the other direction as well, for decreasing x. If a sort 
of market, say around cepage  wines, is exposed to less substitutability--
presumably especially in lowered contributions from decaying market clusters 
such as for table wine--there can be exploding growth.  
 
Substitutability within and across Conventions 
Substitutability both reflects and feeds commonalties in approaches to 
interpretation and to structuring of network relations that characterize markets 
in a Convention community, which share a culture of distinctive quality. In 
Figure 6, the two upper quadrants--notably a community of markets with 
industriel  convention--rest entirely on sufficient substitutability, specified by x. 
But everywhere in MAP mechanisms of siphoning off various amounts through 
substitutability must reflect from and influence the quality culture there.  
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Supply-and-Demand can be seen as but a warped reflection of the impact 
of substitutability. With given substitutability x for a market, suppose that it 
swells in aggregate revenue from some exogenous disturbance. This could be 
from local epidemic or transportation disruption. In that case, some enlargement 
will also be appearing in other markets of its Convention cluster: The disturbance 
translates, according to the MAP model, to a shift in path dependence index k 
after which that market settles down again into a profile summing to different 
aggregate size, and with corresponding impacts through x on its cousins. 
Supply-and-Demand doesn't reign in such stochastic change in a given market, 
but substitutability may partially equilibrate aggregate sizes across the parallel 
markets.  
Substitutability for a given wine market will be impacted much more by 
another wine market cousin within the same Convention than by a market that is 
cross-stream but entirely outside the wine sector. And it appears that the various 
markets in such a Convention cluster tend to have rather similar values of x, in 
part just because they account for much of each other's substitutability. This 
justifies continuing to assign Convention labels to quadrants in a plane MAP 
since the markets in such a community will tend to have a common value of x as 
third coordinate.  
The basic equations, such as (2), (5), (18), highlighted tau. This 
descriptor/parameter is closely coupled with x  in my derivation of predicted W 
, and so tau remained in the shadow along with x for most of my earlier work 
that concentrated on profiles across the individual market. Tau signals path-
dependency in total size of the market as a whole;5 so tau, via A, is the analog at 
market level to the path-dependency index k from the level of representative 
firm along the market profile indexed by k.  
 37 
Tau is just the ratio of the satisfaction of buyers side--measured as the 
most it could have been induced to pay for the given menu of purchases along 
market profile--to how much it actually paid, which is of course just W  . This is 
analogous to buyers' surplus in economics. So tau is also an analog at market 
level to the profitability, for representative firm. But profit, because chosen by 
the firm through its commitment choice from the profile, is referred to market 
level, while I show here how tau can be aimed at a broader sector. 
Return to formula (18) and note that tau adds to the rate of decrease of W  
with increase in x. So tau increases the siphoning impact from increase in 
substitutability x. The impact of tau on how substitutability shapes aggregate 
market size is even clearer from the following formula (19) for how W  relates to 
the value it would have with all parameters the same except for x being set to 
unity, imposing unique isolation on the market. Designate as W 1 the value of W   
when x=1: see formula (5). 
 
W  =  { W 11-v / ( τ/α) x-1} 1/(x-v)  (19) 
 Note that tau contributes to W 1 itself, in inverse proportionality with tau to the 
power 1/(x-v), so that the extent of siphoning depends on tau somewhat less 
than does W  in formula (18). Of course, no market can persist in isolation when 
v>1, so then there is no W 1, and the formula is inapplicable.  
But then if tau has the large impacts indicated by these formulas, why has 
it not been given more attention? The point is that producers choose what 
volume-price packages to offer. The buyer side can only accept or reject, which 
does give it power to insist on strict equivalence in how good a deal one and 
another of the producers is offering. A mnemonic for Tau is “what a Terrific deal 
here.” 
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But the buyer side has no leverage, in this MAP model, to insist upon a 
terrific deal or indeed any particular level of buyer surplus, except that it not be 
less than zero. For the given market considered alone, tau may be but an 
historical accident of the path-dependent evolution of the market profile. Thus 
tau need not have the operational relevance of x. But it may have within the 
culture of a set of markets in a Convention. 
 
Strategic and policy implications within a sector 
Within the larger scope of a whole sector this picture can change. The 
definition of sector is that most of the substitutability x for one market comes 
from other markets of that sector. The contribution to x for one market just from 
its cousin markets within a quadrant with the same Convention, while it is 
substantial and often mutually symmetric, need not predominate. Overlaps of 
buying (see White 2002, chapter 8) might be smaller with any given market 
outside the given one's cluster but still in the sector while yet their total impact is 
larger.  
The key is that whereas one expects each of the markets within a 
Convention cluster to have much the same substitutability x, whatever the share 
that is attributable to other cluster members, Convention clusters in different 
quadrants may well have very different levels of x. And the contribution in one 
direction from a quadrant to the substitutability parameter x of a market in a 
different quadrant's Convention will tend to be different from that in the reverse 
direction.   
The INRA research team particularly looks to changes, but these, as in the 
shift for Table Wines plotted in Figure 4, need not involve changes in x, the 
degree of substitutability for a market. INRA's attention is focused on major 
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changes underway across the whole wine sector, and there I argue that changes 
in substitutability do play a big role.6  
Take as an example the rapidly emerging cluster(s) of cepage wine 
indicated in Figure 6. Cepage  markets are likely to contribute much to the 
common substitutability of, but accommodate little in their own substitutability, 
from the AOC quadrant cluster--and similarly with respect to the table wine 
cluster(s).  
Participants are also trying to reconstruct as well as re-present the existing 
clusters. Much of these efforts in Languedoc-Roussilon join with those from other 
parts of the Midi to fashion a new cluster, whose wine labels are identified by 
d'Oc, which tries to convince all of its high standing. It is a sort of hybrid--with 
aspects of cepage as well as of AOC and of course the table wines that are 
traditional and remain substantial in the Midi by any measure. 
Once substitutability with other markets enters the dynamics, the picture 
can change for tau. It can emerge fully from the shadows. The buyer side in any 
given market is buying in various other markets, with the extents of these 
crossovers being reflected in x (as is suggested by the formula for x in terms of 
omega in White (2002, ch. 8). Substantively, the buyer side can cross reference 
different markets it buys in according to the tau it experiences. So a difference in 
tau can induce a shift between markets as wholes.  
However, this very fact suggests that within a quadrant, within a 
Convention cluster, not only x  but also tau will tend to be the same. Yet one 
neither expects nor observes tau to be the same in one community of markets as 
in another from different quadrant and Convention. And there can be massive 
shifts, often perceived in simplified terms as shifts in taste, from the buyer side 
between such different clusters of markets. 
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Under such pressure the level of tau in a market is subject to change in 
ensuing maneuvers realized in changing values on k that are coordinate with 
changing values of tau. How big is the direct impact on market aggregate  W ? 
The formal derivation is easy enough. The proportionate decrease in market 
aggregate with increase in tau has been included in equation (15). Note that the 
sign here too is negative, as it was in equation (4), and with the same dependence 
on inverse of (x-v).7 Here this negative result is not so intuitive. It sidesteps 
Supply-and-Demand to say that as buyer side gets happier (the deals in a market 
getting better for buyers) the W  can be expected to go down.8 So this formula 
(15) suggests even more impact on market size from tau. This adds to the adjunct 
role enhancing increase in x that is suggested by equation (4).9  
And feedback loops that involve both x and tau can reach beyond this. 
When siphoning away increases, buyers may well perceive that and seek still 
better deals, leading to higher tau in that market. That is, the levels of tau and x 
may correlate through maneuvers of actors that go beyond the W(y) market 
mechanism as specified so far. As x is perceived to go up, then through pressures 
from elsewhere in the sector tau may be enabled to increase, triggered by buyers 
perception of goods being more easily replaceable. 
The fields of Industrial Organization and Strategic Management both talk 
much of product life-cycles (see White 2002, chapter 13). It should be possible to 
construe these better in terms of feedback loops in x and tau within, and also 
across sectors and conventions.10  The possibilities are manifold. The struggles in 
the wine sector today, not limited to France, seem to especially concern such 
changes, and asymmetries in substitutability. And I suggest there may be 
spiraling feed-backs at work, right within the dynamics working among markets 
modeled in MAP. They reflect interaction across distinct quadrants , since 
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substitution reaches across the whole sector. The earlier results from this MAP 
model can guide further thinking.  
Extensive empirical studies are needed to test such scenarios. And these 
raise two major issues. First, is numerical calculation. Even given the many sets 
of simplifications used in the MAP model, the closed analytic solutions from 
which we derived the equations of proportionate change underlying the 
scenarios hold only for the special case k=0. This designates a median path of 
profile formation with the special property that all the distinct niches for firms 
are equally profitable, proportionately. Empirical applications of the MAP model 
will require very extensive numerical computations of self-consistent solutions 
for other paths. And yet even the most extensive may not give clear qualitative 
insights such as have been claimed in this initial sketch. 
Second, we must probe further equations (4) and (5) above for k=0 
solutions concerning substitution effects. Operationalization is needed in terms 




Section B: Markets facing up-stream 
 
Production flows, of goods or services, these are what most markets 
establish today, rather than exchanges of stocks as in traditional sorts of markets. 
Three roles, not just buyer and seller, are involved in commitments decided in 
making these markets. Part I worked through the implications of these assertions 
with the aid of a specific signaling mechanism operating across some set of firms 
arrayed on quality: The outcomes depended on ratios of contextual sensitivity 
downstream to that upstream, first with respect to valuations of volume 
produced and second with respect to valuation of differential quality of these 
flows.  
Across the world more and more of economic action is becoming 
engrossed into such network systems of production markets. But Part I has left 
out half the possibilities for viable market mechanism. The operation of each 
market, its patterning of commitments by firms to production volumes, evolved 
to shield firms from Knightian uncertainty. In various contexts and eras the focus 
of perceived uncertainty may lie back upstream versus suppliers, rather than, as 
assumed thus far, being downstream vis a vis purchasers. It turns out that the 
two orientations are largely, though not wholly, complementary in that contexts 
that support viable markets of one orientation will not usually support the other 
orientation.  
We first sketch the mechanism for upstream orientation. The second 
subsection then explores substitutability and feedback interactions as in Part I. 
What will remain for further exploration is how cross-stream interactions among 
markets with one orientation may interact with cross-stream interactions among 
markets with the other orientation (see Bothner and White 2001). The third 
section will examine overall how upstream and downstream orientations 
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complement and contrast with one another. It suggests likely correlations to 
various factor markets as well as industries and Conventions.  
Much the same phenomenology of signaling still can support a market 
profile facing back upstream as shield against uncertainty. This dual upstream 
mechanism proves to yield much the same MAP space for arraying outcomes for 
a market according to its context. Again the embedding of a market of firms into 
context is measured by two sensitivity ratios, one as to volume and one as to 
quality. The abstract parallelism permits adaptation of the simplified formulas to 
describe contextual sensitivities for firms in the market as used in Part I. Use the 
same designators v and u for these two ratios.  
But now the context is upside down: Draw the contrast to perfect 
competition, with which we started. With upstream orientation it is the 
downstream buyer side that is seen as predictable, with each firm approximating 
the revenue it anticipates from volume of its output by a determinate curve, 
analogous to cost structure for downstream (but now lying above the W(y) 
profile). Take as a first example Home Depot and its competitor wholesalers, or 
instead supermarket chains in a region. Each such producer has enough 
marketing expertise and experience to be confident of what revenues it can earn 
according to overall volume of throughput it commits to. Only in an occasional 
era would they come to see winds of Knightian uncertainty blowing 
downstream, say when a movement against coupons and sales as improper 
morally took hold.  
As to wine, consider an established market say in Burgundy or Rhone 
reds where experience gives the set of producer-brokers confidence about 
revenues they can get from various levels of production--and with their 
headache the acquisition of their shares of suitably skilled vintners. One also 
could think of Australian producers who have created from scratch a whole 
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industry calibrated to predictable sales internationally of their reliable yet 
distinctive wines of good quality at production volumes large when they can 
inveigle enough skills to pitch in (possibly recruiting from France). . 
So its billings from suppliers, e.g., its wage bill, now is the puzzle for the 
representative firm in choosing its optimum commitment from among a menu 
curve it reads from peers' signals. Now W(y) is this revenue expended, rather 
than the revenue received by the representative firm according to its level of 
output y.  The dual to Figure 3 thus has the set of determinate curves lying above 
rather than below the market profile. This W(y) is now, in producers' eyes, a 
liability to be pushed down, rather than its reward to be pushed up. 
Maximization by the producer pushes down against rather than up with W(y).  
What concerns the suppliers, of course, is the gap by which W(y) exceeds 
their aggregate reluctance to deliver to the representative producer the amounts 
required to produce flow of volume y. This supplier side can enforce equally 
good deals, as to wages over their reluctance or distaste. By how much do the 
wages payments they receive W  exceed their aggregate reluctance to supply? 
This measure, the dual to tau, is the ratio of aggregate reluctance to aggregate W 
. It must be less than unity. Suppliers would simply evaporate from situations 
described by a ratio of unity or more. Operationally, this reluctance to supply 
amounts to the minimum aggregate payment suppliers would have accepted for 
that menu of equally attractive offers.  
But again, the choice of volume commitments is still by the producers. 
Each chooses from its own determinate curve of revenue from downstream. It 
picks that volume which maximizes its net profit after subtraction of the wage 
bill W(y) which it paid.  
Again the sensitivity ratios determine the curvature of W(y). This is the 
curvature that can sustain itself against the competing pressures from producers 
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and from suppliers. It coaxes each producer into a distinctive niche on price, such 
that the niches offer equally good deals in suppliers' eyes.  
With such curvature given, again a whole family of profiles, indexed by k, 
may each prove sustainable. Exactly the same abstract formula (1) continues to 
apply, but with the substantive meaning reversed, W(y) being a liability rather 
than a reward of the representative producer.  
The results are easiest to read not from formulas but from the upstream 
analog to MAP that is given in Figure 9. This also reports, like Figure 7, the 
ranges of k that yield viable markets, now in upstream orientation.  
-- FIGURE  9  ABOUT HERE -- 
Not surprisingly, the pattern of bounding regions by the diagonal and unity lines 
carries through. Five features are striking. Figure 7 is the dual MAP. 
First, what was the COMMON triangle is now forbidden, not viable. So 
upstream orientation cannot hold in contexts close to what is assumed in 
approximating the market in terms of pure competition. The contrast between 
upstream and downstream orientations is greatest just in these contexts. 
And the delights of operation in ADVANCED contexts are not available. 
When buyer sensitivity to quality gets very high relative to suppliers' (large u) 
that must be counterbalanced by low buyer valuation of higher volume relative 
to suppliers' disvaluation of such. But then just that quadrant not available in 
downstream orientation, because of unraveling of profile discussed around 
Figure 4. So these are the second and third striking features. 
The fourth feature is that upstream orientation is maximally viable (range 
of k largest) for the quadrangle with volume sensitivity ratio greater than unity 
and quality sensitivity ratio less than unity (rectangle labeled TRUST for 
downstream orientation earlier). This quadrant is really more  turf for upstream. 
And the fifth feature is that the remaining half plane, PARADOX is indeed 
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equally suitable either for downstream or for upstream orientation of market 
signaling mechanism.  
I will return to the five striking features of upstream orientation after 
introducing substitutability. I will skip separate treatment of unique market. I 
will look only at operation for the median profile, k=0. .  
 
Substitutability and feedback 
Somewhat the same account can be given for cross-stream interaction as in 
the latter part of Section A. The analog to cross-stream substitutability across 
markets facing downstream will continue to be greater than unity, like the 
parameter x was for downstream. This analog to x is the exponential power by 
which aggregate reluctance of suppliers to the market in isolation is pushed up 
by any presence of alternative calls for supplies from other markets. Whereas x 
reflected the shrinking of buyer call for products from the given markets because 
of substitutability with the parallel markets. 
Continue to designate the cross-stream interaction parameter by x, now a 
mnemonic for 'Xcuse me for butting OUT'. Again its minimum size is unity. 
Again, being an independent parameter it defines a third dimension for the dual 
MAP, Figure 9.. 
The formula parallel to (18)  (which reformulated (16) is  
 
(1/W) dW/dx =  - { ln W  - ln (α/τ) } v / x (x-v)      (20) 
Note that here too the aggregate size goes down with small increases in 
interaction, but there is an additional weighting factor, v/x, which lowers the 
predicted rate of decrease..  
 47 
Turn to total outcomes. The ratios of parameters are inverted, but the label 
kept because the same numerical value is assigned for computing results which 
are comparable as to substantive context on cost and buyer sides. 
The analog to formula (3) for a ray  in terms of e is  
h  =  (u - v)/ v (u - 1)    (21). 
It follows that the analog to a ray is an hyperbola passing through the center 
point (1,1), defined by an equation in coordinates measured from that center, U= 
u-1, V= v-1: 
h  =   (U - V) / (V . U)  (22) 
whereas in these coordinates the defining equation for the linear ray (which was 
not reported explicitly in  Part 1) is just  
e   =  (V - U) / (- V)  (23) 
The analog to the basic equation (5) is  equation (24):  
 
W  = q{(τ/(α)v{(h-1)/h}x[{Σ: n=1,..,N} n-b h] (1-v) x}1/(x-v) 
 
This behaves in accordance with the qualitative preview given above. Similar 
analogs to many of the other equations in Part 1 can be derived.  
 
Conclusion 
 Modeling the market mechanism requires nonlinear mathematics. This 
paper develops analytic guidelines for what, in most empirical applications, will 
be primarily iterative numerical calculations. I seek to reach the technical 
audience interested in the resulting problems in identifying parameters and 
estimating equations for outcomes and statistical assessment of reliability. This 
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led me to provide considerable detail on mathematical aspects and the logics of 
fitting.  
But embedding the model in phenomenology is also crucial for reaching 
substantive analysts, and the more technical sections were interspersed among 
more qualitative ones. The substantive aspects raise difficult conceptual issues: 
How should one think of the potential which given production markets emerge 
to exploit, and how is this related to siphoning between them, as well as to level 
of cost of production, influenced as it is by where producers are procuring 
inputs? These too are issues of social construction, like the mechanism within an 
individual market seen as isolated.  
The overall complementarity between Figures 9 and 6, for upstream and 
downstream, is crystal clear. Where downstream is viable, upstream tends not to 
be, and conversely. But turn first to the cone where neither is viable: this area is 
hatch-marked in Figure 7.  
This is a cone of balanced contexts in the sense that the sensitivity ratios on 
volume and quality are similar. The lesson is, as intuition suggests, that the W(y) 
market mechanism falls completely flat only with balance--in other words 
market profiles sustain themselves on the basis of divergence between sensitivity 
ratio on quality and that on volume.  
The upstream orientation indeed sustains itself only when there is the 
greatest divergence between the two ratios. And these two off-diagonal 
quadrants, called TRUST and UNRAVELING earlier, are ones that are less likely 
to sustain robust downstream profiles. In particular the median k=0 profile is not 
sustained there for downstream orientation.  
Downstream orientation sustains itself best when it is on the edge of 
balance between quality and volume sensitivities: indeed COMMON and 
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ADVANCED triangles form a cone that crosses the hatched cone of Figure 7. The 
signaling mechanism supports itself , for downstream orientation,  
Only in the PARADOX region are both the upstream and downstream 
orientations robust for the same context.11 The paradoxical quality for upstream 
orientation--that firms of higher quality in downstream eyes encounter less 
reluctance from the suppliers--indeed is substantively parallel to that given for 
downstream orientation in Part I.   
The real point is interpretation of upstream regions.   
To my book just published Part I adds understanding and analysis of how 
whole markets interact through substitutability with their cross-stream cousins. 
Supply-and-Demand is transmuted into these higher-level structural 
interactions. Part II extends this to markets facing back up-stream and integrates 
results for the two orientations. I have traced implications for evolution both of 
community clusters of markets sharing quality conventions and of whole sectors.   
Today's trends toward greater sub-contracting point back to the putting-
out systems of production that preceded the production market economy. And 
edge markets that deal with services are becoming more prominent, bringing still 
more of social activity into the economy. Large production organizations are 
being unpacked into congeries of smaller organizations linked together in such 
production markets. The parametric mapping of markets by contexts in MAP can 
site much of these developments.  
I developed these extensions while working with a INRA team in 
Montpelier to apply my market model across the wine sector of France. The 
sketch of preliminary findings here can guide more intensive investigations and 
application more broadly in the wine and other sectors. At the same time there is 
a need for drawing possible policy implications, which surely will call also for 
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exploration of the network and cultural configurations among actors which 
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1 Here it seems hard for producer firms to grow and there may tend to be 
more of them in interaction, in conditions similar to those in population ecology 
theories of organization (Carroll and Hannan 1995). 
2 Just after 1900 a massive crisis had led to continuing displacements of 
market mechanism itself by State intervention and by rearrangement of 
producers, including the formation of cooperatives. Larger scope in time, in 
addition to return to network dynamics as in note 1 above, is necessary for 
modeling the 1900 crisis.  The time horizon has to be long enough to model 
investment programs for upgrading quality and cost structure in anticipation of 
rapid growth during the boom spirit in Languedoc before 1900.  
3 Equation (1) derives from the signaling model of Michael Spence (1975), 
who however gave it a cognitive interpretation and incorrectly claimed that a 
profile could form ONLY for u negative. See chapter 5 of White (2002) for 
discussion.  
4 Figure 8, and its ray lines in figure 7, can be contrasted with equation 7.4, 
and the associated Figure 7.4  in White (2002). The latter is a projection 
(approximate) of how market aggregate varies with median quality, with gamma 
(equal to 1/x) held constant.  
5 This path dependency also can be seen as feedback loop between tau and 
x on a first level.  
6 The only sector used as example in this paper is wine. There are other 
compatible empirical studies, notably that for knitted textile production of 
Scotland by Porac et al. (1995). Their analysis  is couched in terms of cognitive 
framing for quality (Porac and Rosa 1996), which is an area under active 
development (Podolny and Hsu 2001).  
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7 Also note, for the previous two equations as well as this one, that 
although u does not appear explicitly, it of course helps govern whether there 
can be any viable market profile.  
8 And of course thus the buyer surplus in absolute terms may also go 
down then. But it is implausible to think in terms of a discrete single buyer actor 
who might seek to maximize its surplus for the given market and manage the 
computation. The main point is that buyer surplus is adjustable only across 
markets that the buyer side is in so that sensible effort at absolute maximization 
is hard to pursue.  
9 That role is not negated by the fact that the rate of change with tau of the 
rate of change of W   with respect to x is itself positive.  This second derivative, 
which is the same also for the order interchanged between x and tau, just says 
that at any given level of x the erosion of  W  with small increase in x is lowered.  
10 The relation between sector and convention clusters is somewhat 
analogous to that between industries and strategic groups (Oster 1982 and see 
Baum and Dobbin 2000 ), but does not rest only on strategic maneuvering.  
11 This conclusion is derived only for the k=0 median solution, and 
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